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In general, human beings tend to try and reconnect after they have been socially rejected. 
It is not clear, however, which role the number of rejecters and rejection sensitivity plays. 
In addition, it is unclear whether the supposed pro-social behaviors are aimed at the 
rejecters or at innocent individuals. By means of a new paradigm, the present pilot study 
investigated compensatory behavior of individuals with varying degrees of social anxiety, 
following varying degrees of rejection. In addition, it was explored toward whom their 
behavior was directed: rejecters or innocent individuals. Female students (N = 34) were 
assessed on their degree of social anxiety and then, based on a personal profile they 
wrote, they were either rejected by 1, 2, or 3 fictional other participants or completely 
accepted. Afterward, the participants had to explicitly rate the creativity of drawings made 
by the others and, in a pro-social reward paradigm, awarded the other participants money 
based on their creativity rating. In addition, implicit social approach tendencies toward 
photos of rejecters, acceptors, or innocent individuals were assessed by means of an 
approach-avoidance task. The results confirmed that people with a low degree of social 
anxiety respond to rejection in a compensatory pro-social manner explicitly as well as 
implicitly, but that people with a high degree of social anxiety fail to do so. With regard to 
sources of rejection, only implicit approach-avoidance tendencies reflected a distinction 
between rejecters and innocent individuals. Theoretical implications are discussed in the 
light of the small sample size and other limitations.
Keywords: social anxiety, social exclusion, rejection, pro-social behavior, degree of rejection, social reward, 
approach-avoidance
INTRODUCTION
Human beings have an evolutionarily determined (DeWall, 2013) “need to belong” which 
may have ensured survival in prehistoric times and still underlies a great part of our social 
behavior today (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Yet, there was also a strong need to be  selective 
in the formation of social bonds in order to avoid those reducing fitness and to engage in 
bonds leading to fitness benefits (Kurzban and Leary, 2001; Wesselmann and Williams, 2017). 
As exclusion from a group significantly jeopardized survival in our ancient past, a breach 
to one’s need to belong has evolved to be, and still is accompanied by potent negative 
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feelings of anxiety, depression, loneliness, and even self-
dehumanization (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Williams and 
Nida, 2011; Bastian et  al., 2013). Accordingly, this leads to 
a pervasive drive of human beings to maintain existing and 
re-establish broken relationships (belongingness hypothesis). 
Therefore it is frequently hypothesized that social exclusion 
leads to compensatory pro-social behavior in order to regain 
acceptance. Research has shown that individuals after being 
ostracized worked harder on a collective group task (Williams 
and Sommer, 1997), were more likely to conform to the 
opinion of others (Williams et  al., 2000), and were more 
likely to comply with social influence tactics (Carter-Sowell 
et  al., 2008). Furthermore, it was found that, after ostracism, 
participants showed increased interest in new groups (Maner 
et  al., 2007), when compared with included participants. In 
addition, they showed increased attention to affiliative facial 
expression (Xu et  al., 2015; Chen et  al., 2017) and were more 
likely to mimic the body language of interaction partners or 
facial expressions intending to increase rapport (Lakin and 
Chartrand, 2005; Lakin et  al., 2008; Cheung et  al., 2015).
As opposed to frequently used ostracism paradigms, in 
which individuals are merely ignored while, e.g., participating 
in a multi-player online ball-tossing game (Williams et  al., 
2000; Hartgerink et  al., 2015), Mallott et  al. (2009)  
rejected participants in their study more explicitly. Participants 
recorded a video message, which was supposedly shown to 
others. Based on this message, they were either rejected or 
accepted later on. Results showed that rejected participants 
rewarded drawings made by others with more money, than 
accepted participants. Twenge et  al. (2001), on the other 
hand, showed that rejected participants evaluated others more 
negatively and gave them more hot sauce to eat (which is 
seen as index for aggressive behavior, Ayduk et  al., 2008) 
in comparison to non-rejected individuals. In a study by 
Buckley et  al. (2004), participants were gradually rejected 
or accepted by another ostensible participant, based on a 
self-written personal profile. Here, rejected participants selected 
more unpleasant audiotapes for the rejecter to listen to (for 
comparable results see Twenge et  al., 2001; Warburton et  al., 
2006). In a series of studies, Twenge and Campbell (2003) 
investigated the influence of narcissism and self-esteem on 
rejection responsivity. They rejected participants by means 
of either instructed recollection of a rejection situation or 
actual rejection from a group by “peer vote.” Their results 
showed that increases in self-reported anger and increased 
“punishment” of former rejecters by means of louder and 
longer blasts of “white noise” (Taylor Aggression Paradigm; 
Taylor, 1967) were related to degrees of narcissism but not 
self-esteem. Based on these contradictory results, it has been 
proposed that individual and situational factors may contribute 
to how someone responds to exclusion. For example, it has 
been suggested that an increasing degree of rejection is 
related to an accumulation of negative affect (Williams et al., 
2000). However, to our knowledge, the association with 
frequency or intensity of rejection on resulting behavior has 
only been explored infrequently and in no systematic way 
so far. For example, Sandstrom et  al. (2017) reported that 
children become increasingly distressed by an increasing 
number of rejecters. In the same line, Tobin et  al. (2018) 
reported increased sadness and anger in people ostracized 
by larger as compared to smaller groups. On the other hand, 
Pfeiffer and In-Albon (2016) found no such effects in 
adolescents. It is also unknown, whether affiliative behavior 
following rejection is exclusively aimed at the perpetrators 
of rejection to reconcile or at others in general to re-affiliate 
as quickly as possible.
With regard to individual factors, it seems that high 
rejection sensitive individuals, when compared to low rejection 
sensitive individuals, evaluated their interaction partners less 
positively after rejection (Ayduk et  al., 1999) and gave them 
more hot sauce to eat (Ayduk et  al., 2008). The core fear 
of individuals with high degrees of social anxiety (HSAs) 
and patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) is to 
be negatively evaluated by others and to be eventually rejected 
(e.g., Rapee and Heimberg, 1997; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Although fears of negative evaluation 
seem to be  normally distributed in the population (Rapee 
and Heimberg, 1997), it appears that individuals at the higher 
end of this distribution are not only more tense in social 
interactions but also increasingly avoidant of social situations. 
To fulfill the criteria of a diagnosis of SAD, these same fears 
and avoidance behaviors must lead to significant disruptions 
of social, educational, or professional functioning (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Based on this increased fear 
of rejection, this group has been heavily investigated in 
ostracism and rejection research in the last years. If assuming 
that the fear of rejection is particularly strong in HSAs, one 
would expect that they would show even more re-affiliative 
behavior after rejection. Yet, potential rejection stresses them 
to such a high degree that it seems to undermine pro-social 
behavior, instead. It has, e.g., been found that after being 
ostracized in a Cyberball game, HSAs have shown prolonged 
negative emotions as well as prolonged impairments in self-
regulation (Oaten et  al., 2008). In the same line, Heeren 
et  al. (2017) investigated brain activation in SAD patients 
and control participants after ostracism and suggested that 
SAD may be  characterized by a “poor ability to recover” 
(Heeren et al., 2017, p. 1) after rejection rather than particular 
differences during the social exclusion. Breen and Kashdan 
(2011) found that participants’ social anxiety predicted feelings 
of anger after imagined rejection. In Mallott et  al. (2009), 
HSAs showed the signs of avoidance such as decreased eye 
contact after rejection and giving others less reward than 
non-anxious controls. In fact, these findings are in line with 
cognitive theories Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 
1997) as well as with a theoretical framework suggesting 
that HSAs tend to preferentially process belief-confirming 
above belief-disconfirming information (Belief-bias; Vroling 
et al., 2016). This implies that HSAs would experience explicit 
or putative rejection as confirmation of their initial beliefs 
and fears, strengthening them even further, and deem any 
action to countervail the rejection pointless (Clark and 
McManus, 2002; Hofmann and DiBartolo, 2010). Congruently, 
only few studies could evidence that people fearing rejection 
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would show increases in affiliative behavior after rejection 
(e.g., Romero-Canyas et al., 2005, 2010; Williams et al., 2005; 
Williams, 2007, 2012; Leary and Hoyle, 2009).
In sum, most studies seem to indicate that rejection-sensitive 
individuals such as HSAs fail to show re-affiliative behavior after 
rejection (in contrast to normal controls), thereby contributing 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet, the circumstances and directions 
under which either re-affiliation or social withdrawal, anger, or 
retaliation occurs are not investigated in a systematic way.
In the current pilot study, inspired by Buckley et  al. (2004) 
and Mallott et al. (2009), we propose an experimental procedure 
to systematically investigate the impact of degree of rejection 
and the direction of re-affiliation on explicit as well as implicit 
compensatory pro-social behaviors and provide first evidence 
for its workability. As social anxiety is more commonly observed 
in women than it is in men (Fehm et  al., 2005; Asher et  al., 
2017), females with varying degrees of social anxiety were 
rejected by zero, one, two, or three others, based on feigned 
evaluations of their personal profile (Buckley et  al., 2004). 
Then, participants explicitly evaluated and rewarded the creativity 
of drawings their rejecters and/or accepters had made (Mallott 
et  al., 2009). To measure implicit social approach-avoidance 
tendencies an approach-avoidance task (AAT; Voncken et  al., 
2012) was used. Here, the participants saw the photos of 
rejecters, accepters, and unknown individuals in profile on a 
computer monitor. Depending on the instructions, participants 
either pulled or pushed a computer joystick. On pulling, the 
individual on the photos gradually turned to face the participants 
(approach), while pushing the joystick made the individual in 
the picture turn away (avoid).
Based on the belongingness hypothesis (Baumeister and 
Leary, 1995; DeWall, 2013) and evidence that human beings 
engage in compensatory pro-social acts after rejection 
(Williams and Sommer, 1997; Williams et  al., 2000; Lakin 
and Chartrand, 2005; Maner et al., 2007; Carter-Sowell et al., 
2008; Lakin et al., 2008; Mallott et al., 2009), it was expected 
that rejection (compared to acceptance) would lead to 
increased rewarding of others as well as increased approach 
tendencies toward face pictures. Additionally, we  expected 
that reward behavior and approach tendencies would 
accumulate with an increasing number of rejecters (Williams 
et  al., 2000). Furthermore, in line with Vroling et  al. (2016), 
it was expected that with increasing levels of social anxiety, 
the reward given by rejected individuals would decrease 
and would lead to a stronger avoidance tendency (Ayduk 
et  al., 1999; Ayduk et  al., 2008; Oaten et  al., 2008; Mallott 
et  al., 2009; Breen and Kashdan, 2011). Due to 
overgeneralization of negative experiences, it was finally 
expected that with increasing degrees of social anxiety, the 
differentiation of rewarding and avoidance between rejecters 
and accepters (innocent individuals) would diminish 
(Maner et  al., 2007; Mallott et  al., 2009; DeWall, 2013).
Exploring the workability of experimental paradigms to 
systematically study the role of social anxiety in response to 
social rejection is particularly important when considering that 
HSAs seem to show subtle affiliative deficits in social interactions 
(Lange et  al., 2014) and are more likely to generalize from 
one experience of (putative) exclusion in an interaction, to 
future interactions, thereby missing opportunities for affiliation 
with new partners (DeWall, 2013).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In order to explore the workability of the proposed setup, the 
sample in this pilot study consisted of 34 female students and 
graduates from Radboud University and the University of 
Applied Sciences (HAN) in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (Table 1), 
in the age range of 18–29 (M = 21.29, SD = 3.09). Participants 
were recruited through an online research participant system 
(SONA) of the Behavioural Science Institute, Nijmegen. The 
study consisted of one 30-min session and a 60-min session. 




Participants were informed about the procedure of the entire 
experiment and signed a consent form. Then they fill out 
TABLE 1 | Baseline characteristics of participants allocated to varying rejection conditions. 
Number of rejecters
Characteristic Zero (n = 9) One (n = 8) Two (n = 9) Three (n = 8) F/χ2
Age 20.56 (2.65) 22.25 (2.82) 22.22 (2.95) 20.13 (3.83) F = 1.09
Social anxiety 24.44 (8.08) 32.00 (6.72) 32.00 (8.34) 28.25 (6.36) F = 2.05
Mother tongue χ2 = 0.29
   Dutch 9 (100%) 8 (100%) 7 (77%) 7 (87%)
   German 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (22%) 1 (12%)
Education χ2 = 0.19
   Psychology 3 (33%) 2 (25%) 3 (33%) 5 (62%)
   Pedagogy 3 (33%) 2 (25%) 1 (11%) 2 (25%)
   Other 1 (11%) 4 (44%) 3 (33%) 1 (11%)
   Graduated 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 2 (22%) 0 (0%)
Table represents numbers (percentage) or means (standard deviations) for each variable.
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online questionnaires through the online survey platform Unipark 
EFS (Globalpark, 2011) assessing socio-demographics. These 
included current age, their field of study, and mother language. 
In addition, this questionnaire included an assessment of their 
degree of social anxiety (for overview, see Table 1). A core 
aspect of social anxiety was assessed by means of the Brief 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983), measuring 
the fear of being negatively evaluated by others. This scale 
has excellent psychometric properties (Collins et  al., 2005). 
For 12 items (e.g., “I am  frequently afraid of other people 
noticing my shortcomings”), participants indicated on a five-
point Likert scale how much a statement applied to them 
(1 = “not at all characteristic of me” to 5 = “extremely 
characteristic of me”). Subsequently, participants wrote four 
short sentences describing themselves and were then 
photographed. They were placed on a swivelling office chair 
in front of a gray wall and eight pictures were taken, turning 
the chair in steps of 30° to mimic the stimuli in the Face-
Turn Approach-Avoidance task (AAT; Voncken et  al., 2012). 
Participants were informed that this information would be used 
to construct a personal profile, which they would exchange 
with other participants in the second session before meeting 
them in person. They were also told that the pictures would 
be used in a computer task (but that pictures would be deleted 
after participation). After this first session, the researcher 
constructed a profile page of the participant, using the four 
sentences and a photograph of the participant facing straight 
into the camera (Figure 1A). Three other profiles were also 
constructed to represent the fictional individuals the participant 
would supposedly interact with. Photographs were derived from 
the Radboud Emotional Face Database (RaFD; Langner et  al., 
2010) and were included in the AAT (Voncken et  al., 2012). 
The second session was planned 1 or 2  days later.
Second Session
Participants were handed the three profiles of the fictional other 
individuals. They were instructed to read the profiles and to 
answer two questions: First, they had to indicate how sympathetic 
this person seemed to them on a visual analogue scale (VAS; 
Torrance et  al., 2001), a 100  mm horizontal line ranging from 
0 = “not at all” to 100  =  “very much.” Second, they were asked: 
“Would you  like to work with this person?”, which could 
be answered by circling “yes” or “no.” Afterward, they completed 
four additional VASs allowing us to assess mood changes due 
to the inclusion/exclusion manipulation: “How positive do you feel 
right now?”; “How anxious do you feel right now?”; “How angry 
do you  feel right now?”; and “How much would you  like to 
escape from this situation?”, again ranging from 0  =  “not at 
all” to 100  =  “very much”. VAS scales have been shown to 
accurately and validly measure state affect (McCormack et  al., 
1988), and, in this particular case, served as a manipulation 
check. After giving the instructions, the researcher left the room, 
supposedly to visit the other participants. After several minutes, 
the researcher returned and collected the rated profiles and the 
VAS scales. They told the participant that they would leave, 
again, to inform the others how the participant had rated their 
profiles and would return with the others’ evaluation of her 
profile. Meanwhile, the participants were instructed to draw a 
building for later evaluation.
Outside the lab, the researcher prepared the ratings of the 
participant’s profile by the “others” according to the randomly 
assigned conditions (number of rejecters): For the question 
“Would you  like to work with this person?”, “No” was circled 
on either one, two, all three, or none of the copies. Accordingly, 
the VASs concerning the evaluation of sympathy of the participant 
would be  marked at 10 or 20  mm in case of rejection (close 
to “not at all” sympathetic), and at 80 or 90  mm in case of 
acceptance (close to “very much”). Subsequently, three stacks 
were prepared with in the upper-left corner a photograph of 
the person that had supposedly rated the profiles, followed 
by the rated profile of the participant, and the participant’s 
profile rated by the two other fictional individuals (Figure 1A). 
Consequently, this resulted in every participant receiving three 
of their profile copies back, each marked in a way that each 
participant is at randomly rejected (i.e., “no” circled in reply 
to question “Would you  want to work with that person?” with 
A B
C
FIGURE 1 | Examples of rejected personal profile with photo of ‘rejecter’ on top (A), and, adapted from Voncken et al. (2012) with permission of SpringerNature: 
AAT stimuli when pulled (B) or when pushed (C).
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respective sympathy ratings) by either none, one, two, or all 
three of the imaginative other participants. The assignment of 
the photographs/fictional participants to a certain role (accepter 
or rejecter) was counterbalanced.
The researcher and participant would then go through the 
rated profiles together. In the rejection conditions, the researcher 
would explain that the meeting with the others would 
be  cancelled as it would be  unethical to force participants to 
work together although they do not want to. In the acceptance 
condition, they were told the same, but now because one of 
the other participants was indicated as someone that the others 
did not want to work with. In all instances, it was explained 
that this was not foreseen and that, as a consequence, the 
planned interaction task had to be  omitted.
The researcher then explained that they would proceed with 
a task that had been planned to follow the interaction task. 
For this reward assignment task (Mallott et al., 2009), participants 
were, in a rigged lottery, assigned to judge the drawings of the 
other participants in an art contest, rather than being contestant. 
While the researcher would pick up the drawings supposedly 
made by the other participants, the participant was asked to 
fill in the four VASs related to their current affect state, again.
After their return, the researcher spread out the drawings in 
front of the participant with the photos of the contestants visible. 
Again, the assignment of these drawings to one of the three 
individuals/photos was counterbalanced. The researcher placed 
an evaluation form beside the participant, on which they wrote 
down the names of the contestants, and assigned them with a 
letter (A, B, or C). To measure explicit pro-social behavior, 
participants were instructed to judge each drawing on creativity 
(0 = “not at all creative” to 100 = “very creative”) and to reward 
the contestants by distributing money (10 euro in coins, provided 
by the researcher) over four different cups, labeled with A, B, 
C, or “raffle.” They were informed that money placed in the 
raffle cup would be  gathered throughout the whole study and 
then raffled among participants. Then, the researcher left the 
room while the participant rated the pictures.
Upon finishing the reward task, the researcher set up and 
explained the Face-Turn AAT task (Figures 1B,C; for technical 
details, see Voncken et  al., 2012). Participants were instructed 
to either pull a joystick when faces or computer monitors on 
the screen were, e.g., facing left and push when facing right. 
Every type of stimulus [8 monitors, 8 male, 8 female (among 
which the 3 “fictional characters”)] was shown twice in each of 
10 blocks, once facing left and once facing right. Participants 
were first given one practice trial for each type of stimulus 
(monitor, female and male) and direction. Subsequently, they 
performed the 10 blocks of 48 pre-randomized trials. Participants 
were given a short break after 120 trials and again after 240 
trials. Then, the instructions were reversed (e.g., pull left and 
push right). They were again given the opportunity to practice, 
before finishing the last 240 trials (with a short break after 120 
trials). The order of instructions was counterbalanced across 
participants. The reaction time and accuracy of the responses 
were recorded. Pictures of the three fictional participants were 
used to assess responses directed toward specific rejecters as well 
as innocent individuals. Specifically, 60 of the 480 trials/stimuli 
showed the fictional participants while 420 depicted unfamiliar 
stimuli (160 male, 160 monitors, and 100 females). Finally, 
participants were compensated, debriefed, and thanked.
Data Analysis
A bootstrap re-sampling procedure (1,000 iterations, 95% 
confidence interval) was used to compensate for unequal sample 
sizes between some of the compared groups. Participants’ explicit 
behavioral responses to (degree of) rejection, in relation with 
their levels of social anxiety, was analyzed by means of an 
ANCOVA with money given to others as the dependent variable 
(DV), condition [acceptance vs. (degree of) rejection] as between-
subject independent variable (IV) and social anxiety (total score 
BFNE) as covariate. Further, to be  able to explore behavioral 
differences of a participant directed at accepters vs. rejecters, 
a subset of those participants was analyzed who were accepted 
and rejected by at least one person. This was done by using 
a repeated-measures ANCOVA, with target (mean amount of 
money given to rejecters versus innocent individuals) as within-
subject factor and social anxiety as covariate.
To analyze implicit responses toward (degree of) rejection 
in relation with their varying levels of social anxiety, first, 
AAT scores were calculated, by subtracting the pull response 
time (RT) scores from the push RTs for the same stimuli. 
Computer monitors were seen as filler material and responses 
to them were not analyzed. An ANCOVA was performed with 
AAT score as DV, condition as the between-subject IV and 
social anxiety as covariate. Lastly, the difference in participants’ 
implicit responses toward new or innocent individuals compared 
to their rejecters was analyzed with a repeated-measures 
ANCOVA with target (AAT response toward rejecters and 
innocent individuals) as within-subject variable and social 
anxiety as covariate. Again, only the data from participants 
who were rejected by either one or two individuals were used.
As manipulation check, repeated-measures analyses were 
performed to investigate changes in subjective mood from 
before to after the manipulation. Reported scores for positive 
mood, anger, desire to escape, and anxiety were added as 
DVs, with time (before vs. after the manipulation) as within-
subject variable and condition (acceptance vs. rejection) as 
between-subject variable. Subsequently, the analyses were repeated 
with degree of rejection as between-subject variable instead.
Several scatterplots were made to provide additional 
clarification of the results. Where necessary, additional post 
hoc (Pearson bivariate correlation) analyses were performed 
to examine significant or trending interactions with social 
anxiety, mood, and/or conditions. In the light of the small 
sample sizes of the subsamples, it has to be  stressed that these 
follow-up analyses were merely of an exploratory nature.
RESULTS
Baseline Differences
Participants rejected by either zero, one, two, or three individuals 
did not differ statistically, in terms of age, nationality, education, 
or social anxiety (Table 1).
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Pro-social Reward Paradigm
Rejection vs. Acceptance
Results revealed a non-significant trend of condition, F(1, 30) = 4.39, 
p  =  0.05, hp2   =  0.13, with rejected participants (n  =  25) given 
less money in comparison to accepted participants (n  =  9; see 
Table 2). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction 
between social anxiety and condition, F(1, 30)  =  5.84, p  =  0.04, 
hp2   =  0.14 (Table 2). Explorative follow-up Pearson bivariate 
correlation analysis suggested a non-significant trend toward a 
negative relationship between social anxiety and the amount of 
money given in the rejection condition (n  =  25), r  =  −0.39, 
p = 0.06 (two-tailed), which may mean that the higher someone’s 
degree of social anxiety was, the less money they gave. A visual 
inspection of the interaction effect (Figure 2) supported that 
notion. In the acceptance condition (n  =  9), social anxiety was 
not correlated to amount of money given, r  =  0.56, p  =  0.12 
(Figure 2A, left), while visual inspection suggests an increase in 
money given when one’s degree of social anxiety is higher.
Number of Rejecters
Results revealed no significant difference in amount of money 
given when someone was rejected by either zero, one, two, 
or three individuals, F(1, 26)  =  1.78, p  =  0.18, hp2   =  0.17 
(Table 2). In addition, there was no significant interaction 
between social anxiety and the number of rejecters, F(1, 
26)  =  2.01, p  =  0.14, hp2   =  0.19. Visual inspection of the 
interaction between social anxiety and the number of rejecters 
generally supports the results from the previous analysis section: 
A general decrease of money given, when social anxiety increases; 
however, this mostly seems to be  the case in individuals that 
were rejected by two or three rejecters (Figure 2A, middle).
Rejecters vs. Innocent Individuals
There was no significant main effect of target, F(1, 10)  =  2.39, 
p  =  0.15, hp2   =  0.19 (n  =  17), suggesting that the amount of 
money given to rejecters did not significantly differ from the 
amount given to innocent individuals (Table 2). In addition, 
there was no significant interaction between social anxiety and 
target, F(1, 10)  =  2.14, p  =  0.17, hp2   =  0.18. Although the 
data points in Figure 2A (right) are quite dispersed, it appears 
as if, socially anxious individuals gave more money to innocent 
individuals while reducing the amount for rejecters.
Approach-Avoidance Task
Rejection vs. Acceptance
For AAT response toward human pictures, a non-significant 
trend of condition was found, F(1, 30) = 3.91, p = 0.06, hp2  = 0.12, 
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Scatterplot showing the relationship between condition, social anxiety and money given (A) or approach-avoidance responses (B).
TABLE 2 | Money given to others and approach-avoidance scores across 
conditions.
Money given AAT scores
Condition M SD M SD
Acceptance (n = 9) 7.39 1.34 −2.90 37.85
Rejection (n = 25) 7.06 2.01 25.72 66.90
Number of rejecters
Zero (n = 9) 7.39 1.34 −2.90 37.85
One (n = 8) 6.96 2.00 54.39 57.45
Two (n = 9) 6.62 2.48 9.32 76.13
Three (n = 8) 7.66 1.49 15.52 63.37
Target
Innocents (n = 17) 2.37 0.92 36.28 210.90
Rejecters (n = 17) 2.24 0.85 −21.73 219.68
AAT scores, Approach-avoidance task scores, calculated as: push response times-pull 
response times for the same stimuli.
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with rejected individuals (n = 25) tending to have a more positive 
score than non-rejected individuals (n  =  9). This means that 
they turned faces (pulled the joystick) quicker toward themselves 
(approach) than they turned them (pushed the joystick) away 
(avoidance; see Table 2). There was no significant interaction 
between social anxiety and condition, F(1, 30)  =  2.53, p  =  0.12, 
hp2   =  0.08. Visual inspection of Figure 2B (left) shows indeed 
that AAT scores in the rejection conditions seemed slightly higher 
than in the acceptance condition. With higher degrees of social 
anxiety, individuals seemed to show increasing approach when 
accepted, and more avoidance when rejected, although it is likely 
that that these differences may have been caused by some 
extreme values.
Number of Rejecters
A non-significant trend for number of rejecters was found, 
F(1, 26)  =  2.82, p  =  0.06, hp2   =  0.25. This seems to imply 
that, in general, non-rejected individuals tended to be  quicker 
to turn faces away (avoidance), whereas individuals that were 
rejected by one or three individuals were quicker to turn faces 
towards (approach) themselves (see Table 2). In addition, a 
non-significant trend of an interaction with social anxiety was 
found, F(1, 26)  =  2.85, p  =  0.06, hp2   =  0.25. Exploratory 
correlations between social anxiety and AAT scores revealed 
that increasing degrees of social anxiety were related to more 
avoidance, but only after rejection by two others, r  =  −0.72, 
p  =  0.03 (two-tailed). In all other rejection conditions, the 
correlations were not significant, with all p’s  >  0.29. Visual 
inspection of Figure 2B (middle) suggests that the significantly 
steeper decline of the slope for two rejecters may be  caused 
by an extreme observation in the data, while the slightly positive 
slope for one rejecter was probably caused by an extreme 
observation as well. Consequently, this could mean that an 
increasing number of rejecters may generally be  related to 
increasing avoidance responding when degrees of social 
anxiety accumulate.
Rejecters vs. Innocent Individuals
Results revealed a non-significant trend of target, F(1, 13) = 4.00, 
p  =  0.07, hp2   =  0.24. Participants (n  =  17) had a negative 
AAT score/stronger avoidance-tendency toward their rejecters, 
while showing a (more) positive AAT score/approach-tendency 
toward innocent individuals (see Table 2). In addition, a 
non-significant trend of an interaction was found between 
social anxiety and target, F(1, 13) = 3.55, p = 0.08, hp2  = 0.21. 
Explorative, two-tailed correlation analyses; however, revealed 
no significant relationship between social anxiety and AAT 
scores neither in response to rejecters, r  =  0.40, p  =  0.13, 
nor in response to innocent individuals r  =  −0.41, p  =  0.10. 
Visual inspection of Figure 2B (right) showed that an 
increasing degree of social anxiety seemed to be  associated 
with an increase of approach tendencies toward rejecters 
and an increase of avoidance impulses toward accepters. 
Yet, it has to be  acknowledged that the data points are 




When looking at the different subjective mood reports, there 
was no main effect of time with regard to positive mood, 
F(1, 32)  =  0.58, p  =  0.45, hp2   =  0.02. However, a significant 
interaction was found between time and condition, 
F(1, 32)  =  5.39, p  =  0.03, hp2   =  0.14. Accepted individuals 
(n  =  9) showed an increase in positive mood and rejected 
participants (n  =  25) showing a decrease in positive mood. 
For feelings of anger, a non-significant trend of time was found 
F (1, 32)  =  3.51, p  =  0.07, hp2   =  0.10, showing an increase 
in anger from before to after the manipulation; however, no 
significant interaction was found with condition, F(1, 32) = 2.14, 
p  =  0.15, hp2   =  0.06. No time effects were found for desire 
to escape, F(1, 32)  =  1.86, p  =  0.18, hp2   =  0.06, and anxiety, 
F(1, 32)  =  1.65, p  =  0.21, hp2   =  0.05, nor did significant 
interaction effects occur, F(1, 32) = 2.07, p = 0.16, hp2  = 0.06., 
F(1, 32)  =  0.15, p  =  0.70, hp2   =  0.01, respectively (Table 3). 
Visual inspection of Figure 3A (left) supports the idea that 
accepted participants showed an increase in mood and rejected 
participants, a decline. With regard to increasing degrees of 
social anxiety, the mood decline appeared be particularly strong.
Number of Rejecters
For changes in positive mood, a significant main effect of 
time was found, F(1, 30) = 5.52, p = 0.03, hp2  = 0.16, showing 
an overall decrease in positive mood from before to after the 
manipulation. In addition, there was a significant interaction 
with number of rejecters, F(1, 30) = 4.14, p = 0.01, hp2  = 0.29. 
The group with three rejecters had the strongest decrease in 
positive mood, followed by two rejecters and one rejecter, 
showing that the more individuals a participant was rejected 
by the stronger the decline in positive mood was. In contrast, 
the group with no rejecters showed an increase in positive 
mood (Table 3). For anger, a significant time effect was found, 
F(1, 30)  =  9.67, p  =  0.004, hp2   =  0.24, showing an overall 
increase in anger. For desire to escape a significant time effect 
was found as well, F(1, 30)  =  6.28, p  =  0.02, hp2   =  0.17, 
showing an overall increase of the desire to avoid from before 
to after the manipulation. However, for anxiety, no significant 
time effect was found, F(1, 30)  =  1.48, p  =  0.23, hp2   =  0.05. 
No further interaction effects were found between time and 
condition, neither for anger, desire to escape, nor anxiety, all 
F’s  <  2.21, all p’s  >  10 (see Table 3 for descriptives). Here, 
TABLE 3 | Affect-change scores across the varying rejection conditions.
Number of rejecters
Zero (n = 9) One (n = 8) Two (n = 9) Three (n = 8)
Variable M SD M SD M SD M SD
Positive mood 4.67 8.97 −2.25 10.79 −6.22 14.10 −19.50 21.37
Desire to escape −0.22 10.49 6.25 19.02 2.67 12.16 17.25 17.77
Anger 0.89 7.83 4.63 13.11 3.78 6.69 13.75 14.32
Anxiety −5.56 18.64 1.13 6.67 −2.89 11.33 −7.25 26.76
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visual inspection (Figure 3A, right) supports the notion that 
mood declines differently when accepted and rejected conditions 
are compared and that social anxiety may amplify the drop 
in mood but that the degree of rejection does not seem to 
matter herein.
Exploratory Analyses
Relationship Between Changes in Positive Mood 
and Social Anxiety
To explore the correlation between social anxiety and changes 
in subjective mood, difference scores of mood were calculated 
(MoodAfter – MoodBefore) and were subsequently entered in 
exploratory post hoc correlation analyses together with social 
anxiety scores. These correlation analyses (two-tailed) revealed 
that social anxiety was overall (N  =  34) significantly negatively 
correlated to change in positive mood, r  =  −0.43, p  =  0.01, 
meaning that the higher a person’s social anxiety was, the 
stronger was their decrease in positive mood. When exploring 
this relationship in more detail, it appeared that this relationship 
showed a non-significant trend for individuals that were rejected, 
r  =  −0.36, p  =  0.08 (n  =  25), but no significance for those 
being accepted, r  =  −0.31, p  =  0.41 (n  =  9). Visual inspection 
of Figure 3A (left) indeed shows a stronger decrease in mood 
with higher degrees of social anxiety both for accepted as well 
as rejected participants. However, the mood decline does appear 
to be stronger for rejected individuals. In addition, when looking 
at the specific number of rejecters, it was revealed that the 
relationship between changes in positive mood and social anxiety 
was only significant when participants were rejected by two 
individuals, r = −0.72, p = 0.03 (Figure 3A, right). The correlations 
for rejections by zero individuals (thus accepted), r  =  −0.31, 
by one, r  =  −0.59, and three individuals, r  =  −0.41 were not 
significant, all p’s > 0.10. Visual inspection of Figure 3A (right) 
on the other hand, does not provide clear-cut support for the 
idea that rejection by two rejecters should be  significantly 
stronger related to social anxiety than rejection by one or three 
rejecters. In fact, the decline of the slopes seems fairly similar, 
with the regression lines of the conditions with two vs. three 
rejecters appearing almost parallel.
Relationship Between Changes in Positive Mood, 
Money Given and Approach-Avoidance Task
No significant relationship was found between changes in positive 
mood and amount of money given, r  =  0.14, p  =  0.43. For 
AAT responses, no significant relationship was found with 
changes in positive mood, r = 0.05, p = 0.76. Visual inspection 
of Figure 3 indeed shows a mostly linear slope for both, money 
given (Figure 3B) as well as AAT responses (Figure 3C). 
However, extreme values on the lower side of the mood changes 
may have influenced the slopes to some degree.
A
B C
FIGURE 3 | Scatterplots showing the relationship between changes in positive mood, social anxiety, and conditions (A) and the relationship between changes in 
positive mood and money given (B) as well as approach-avoidance scores (C).
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DISCUSSION
The current study proposed and piloted an experimental setup 
to explore explicit and implicit pro-social behavior following 
rejection in relation to social anxiety. In addition, the setup 
was used to examine whether this behavior varies with different 
degrees of rejection and toward whom the pro-social behavior 
is directed: the perpetrators of rejection or innocent individuals.
Overall, a non-significant trend as well as visual inspection 
of the data suggested that people gave less money when they 
were rejected and more when they were accepted. This seems 
contrary to our prediction based on the belongingness hypothesis 
by Baumeister and Leary (1995) and previous studies showing 
that participants responded in a compensatory pro-social manner 
after rejection (e.g., Williams et  al., 2000; Lakin et  al., 2008; 
Mallott et  al., 2009). However, when taking social anxiety into 
account, a different pattern emerged. Results seem to indicate 
that people with higher levels of social anxiety (SA) gave less 
money when rejected while people with low levels of SA seemed 
to give more money. In the acceptance condition, the opposite 
pattern seems to emerge, although only from the visually plotted 
data not from the statistical analyses. Yet, these results correspond 
with our hypothesis as well as with research findings from Mallott 
et al. (2009) whom reported that low socially anxious participants 
displayed more pro-social behavior after rejection, whereas HSAs 
showed a trend toward less pro-social behavior. This hints at the 
possibility that the belongingness hypothesis does hold true but 
only for those with medium to low degrees of social anxiety. 
This idea also seems to be compatible with the rejection sensitivity 
model (Downey and Feldman, 1996), which posits that highly 
rejection sensitive individuals more readily perceive negativity and 
a high possibility of rejection in social situations, which can lead 
to maladaptive overreactions. For socially anxious individuals, 
this becomes even more pressing: Although HSAs’ core fear entails 
expectation of inevitable rejection, it seems as if they “secretly 
abandon” any thought about how to handle true rejection. This 
seems in line with cognitive models of SAD (e.g., Rapee and 
Heimberg, 1997) as well as research suggesting that HSAs may 
preferentially process belief-confirming above belief-disconfirming 
information (Belief-bias; Vroling et  al., 2016). In addition, it may 
be  the case that while HSAs have a whole repertoire of emotions 
and strategies available to try and manage their fears and prevent 
their utmost nightmare to become true, they do not know how 
to behave once rejection does indeed occur. Maladaptive 
overreactions in such a situation might be explained by the social 
skills deficit theory (for review, see Levitan and Nardi, 2009; for 
critical discussion, see also: Schneider and Turk, 2014) which 
suggests that people with social anxiety may have failed to learn 
effective social behavior by not fitting into environmental demands 
and experiencing extreme anxiety. Taking this theory into account, 
it may be  the case that people with higher degrees of social 
anxiety might not have learned how to effectively deal with 
rejection and to regain acceptance by acting in a compensatory 
pro-social manner, primarily because they may have effectively 
avoided experiencing and dealing with true rejection.
Unlike expected, no significant differences were found in 
amount of money given when someone was rejected by one, 
two, or three people nor was it found to be  related to social 
anxiety. This is particularly surprising when considering that 
the more individuals a participant was rejected by, the stronger 
their decline was in terms of positive mood. While the latter 
seems to fit with findings that an increasing level of ostracism 
was associated with an increasing impact on participants’ emotions 
and mood (Sandstrom et  al., 2017; Tobin et  al., 2018; but also, 
Pfeiffer and In-Albon 2016), the fact that these studies have 
not looked at the association between subjective self-report 
measures and actual behavior makes it difficult to draw solid 
solutions. It is possible that a stepwise decline of, e.g., positive 
mood does not directly translate to distinguishable differences 
in overt behavior. The rating of creativity and the consequential 
allotting of money may be  too much of an abstract conscious 
act to be  driven by fine-grained mood differences triggered by 
rejection by, e.g., three rather than two others. When looking 
at the visual representation of the data, it is thinkable that the 
current results are driven by some extreme values and that an 
increase in social anxiety may after all have a distinct effect 
depending on the number of rejecters. In any case, to explore 
the idea of proportional transfer from emotion and mood to 
explicit behavior in more detail, the difference in number of 
rejecters, may need to be  bigger (e.g., zero, three, six, and nine 
rejecters). In the same vein, it would be  worthwhile to explore 
the idea of repeated and/or increasing degrees of rejection rather 
than having a one-shot setup (Buckley et  al., 2004). In the 
present study, participants were only rejected once.
Contrary to our expectation, neither the statistical results 
nor visual inspection of the data pointed clearly at significant 
differences between rewards allotted to innocent individuals 
or specific perpetrators of rejection nor was there an influence 
of social anxiety. While on the one hand, rejected people, in 
general, have been found to indeed retaliate against their 
perpetrators when possible (e.g., Twenge and Campbell, 2003; 
Buckley et  al., 2004); research suggests that socially anxious 
individuals should be  even more inclined to do so (Ayduk 
et al., 1999, 2008). On the other hand, they tend to overgeneralize 
from one instance of rejection to subsequent situations and 
are consequently thought to be  less accurate in distinguishing 
accepter from rejecter (Maner et  al., 2007; Mallott et  al., 2009; 
DeWall, 2013). Our current results seem to suggest, however, 
that compensatory responses after rejection might be  more 
generalized and not specifically directed at certain individuals, 
irrespective of a person’s level of social anxiety. As stated earlier, 
the association between the specific cause of one’s negative 
mood and the act of allotting money based on the other’s 
creativity may be  too weak to have a significant impact. In 
addition, there may be  an important conceptual difference 
between retaliating against someone (Twenge and Campbell, 
2003) and not rewarding someone, as was the case in our 
task. As a matter of fact, less reward can only be  seen as 
punishment if the receiver has a comparison standard. A real 
punishment would be to allot no money at all for the rejecter(s), 
but here feelings of fairness (Arkin et  al., 1980) or social 
desirability for which socially anxious individuals are very 
susceptible (Tanaka Matsumi and Kameoka, 1986) may take 
over. In future research, an option to truly retaliate against 
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the other should be  added to be  able to contrast participants’ 
response to their responses when “rewarding” their rejecters.
With regard to implicit behavior, our results partly confirm 
our hypotheses: In general, rejected participants had a stronger 
approach tendency when compared to non-rejected participants, 
although visual data inspection suggests that a few extreme values 
may have been responsible. Social anxiety, however, did not 
play a significant role. Should the main effect be  valid, it would 
be  in line with the belongingness hypothesis (Baumeister and 
Leary, 1995). Again, the stronger approach tendency in rejected 
participants may indicate implicit compensatory behavior and 
the desire to reconnect. In the same line, research indicates 
that, after social exclusion, participants tended to focus more 
on pictures of positive faces Chen et  al. (2017) and showed 
increased facial mimicry and emotion encoding accuracy (Cheung 
et  al., 2015) propagating social approach. The lacking influence 
of social anxiety is surprising. Although not concerning punishment 
one would have expected that in line with Ayduk et  al. (1999, 
2008) individuals with high degrees of SA would be more inclined 
to avoid after rejection, contrasting with the general social 
approach tendencies of non-anxious individuals. This is difficult 
to explain, but the small sample size may have played a role 
in here. Having a look at the differentiation between the different 
number of rejecters may help to shed light on the matter.
Non-rejected individuals showed an overall tendency to have 
more negative scores than those that were rejected by one or 
more individuals, again, seemingly indicating a stronger approach 
tendency in rejected individuals. In addition, a trend of an 
interaction between number of rejecters and social anxiety was 
found. Further analyses revealed that the higher one’s social 
anxiety was, the more negative their AAT scores were, indicating 
a stronger avoidance tendency. This relationship, however, was 
revealed only in participants that were rejected by two individuals. 
When inspecting the data visually, it seems as if a few extreme 
observations may have influenced the results here. When 
disregarding them, it appears as if the slope of avoidance per 
number of rejecter may have declined steeper per added rejecter 
and increasing social anxiety. Yet, in the light of the small 
sample size, this is quite speculative and cannot be  tested 
statistically. Interestingly, however, exploratory analyses have also 
revealed a significant relationship between change in positive 
mood and social anxiety in this particular condition, showing 
a higher decrease in mood in those scoring higher on anxiety. 
Again, this relationship may be inflated by extreme observations. 
Yet, these results seem to be  partly in line with expectations, 
as it was believed that those high in social anxiety would 
be more negatively affected and that they would show a stronger 
avoidance tendency in response to rejection in comparison to 
those low in social anxiety due to their sensitivity to socially 
stressful situations (Downey and Feldman, 1996; Rapee and 
Heimberg, 1997). When disregarding the possibility that small 
sample size and extreme observations may have been skewing 
the results, it is puzzling that this relationship would be strongest 
when rejected by two individuals. One possible explanation 
could be the ambiguity of such a situation. When one is rejected 
by only one out of three participants, it could be  rationalized 
that this individual was merely an exception. In the case of 
three rejecters, it might be  the most painful (as the results of 
our manipulation check also suggest), but the verdict is at least 
unanimous. Previous literature indeed suggests that socially 
anxious individuals seem to interpret and respond to ambiguous 
situations in a more negative way (Stopa and Clark, 2000; Zadro 
et  al., 2006; Staugaard, 2010). However, a study by Zimmer-
Gembeck and Nesdale (2013) found that highly rejection sensitive 
participants were more likely to report retribution as their 
anticipated response to ambiguous situations and more likely 
to report avoidance as their anticipated response to non-ambiguous 
situations. These results do not seem to correspond with ours, 
as avoidance seems more similar to withdrawal then to retribution. 
The difference in methodology calls into question whether the 
same results can be  expected. Yet, it does indicate that the 
importance of ambiguity when studying responses to rejection 
needs to be  taken into account although statistical restrictions 
of our own results should kept in mind.
When looking at differences in automatic responses directed 
toward pictures of rejecters and accepters or innocent others, 
it was found that in general participants had a stronger avoidance 
tendency towards their rejecters. However, when taking social 
anxiety in account, it was revealed that this was mostly the 
case for people with low degrees of SA. With increasing levels 
of SA, there was a stronger approach tendency toward rejecters 
and a stronger avoidance tendency toward innocent individuals. 
This seems contrary to our expectation based on previous 
literature (Maner et al., 2007; Mallott et al., 2009; DeWall, 2013), 
suggesting that the distinction between specific sources of rejection 
and innocent individuals would diminish with higher degrees 
of SA. Furthermore, this differentiation in responses was not 
found in our reward task. This may mean that explicit 
compensatory responses after rejection might be more generalized 
since they are diluted by cognitive elaboration and social 
desirability, implicit approach or avoidance tendencies are more 
of an impulsive evaluative nature bypassing conscious exploration. 
Intriguingly, it seems that HSA individuals may not tend to 
show overt re-affiliate behavior after being rejected and make 
no distinction between rejecters and acceptors, but they may 
still feel inclined to re-affiliate on an implicit level particularly 
toward former rejecters. This discrepancy is difficult to disentangle, 
at this point, but it clearly indicates that HSAs show explicit 
and implicit behaviors after acceptance as well as after rejection 
that are opposite to what would be  normally expected thereby 
exacerbating the chances of acceptance. However, the underlying 
mechanisms warrant further investigation.
In order to explore indirect effects of mood changes on 
the dependent measures, additional analyses revealed that the 
higher a rejected participant’s social anxiety was, the stronger 
their decrease of positive mood was. This makes perfect sense 
when keeping in mind that rejection is the core fear of HSAs. 
However, this decrease of positive mood did not directly relate 
to either the explicit (giving money) nor the implicit (AAT 
scores) responses towards rejection. Instead, it seems that social 
anxiety by itself plays an important role in how someone 
emotionally responds to rejection, while this emotional change 
does not seem to explain any additional variance in the measured 
behaviors. This is partially in line with Heeren et  al. (2017) 
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suggesting that differences in socially anxious responding after 
rejection may show not so much in direct responding but 
rather in delayed recovery (see also, Zadro et  al., 2006).
Apart from these theoretical considerations, a number of 
limitations have to be acknowledged. First and most importantly, 
the sample size of this pilot study (N  =  34) was very small, 
especially considering the number of groups (with different sample 
sizes) which were compared, resulting in an overall low statistical 
power and some of the investigated effects approaching, rather 
than reaching significance. In addition, comparing, e.g., 9 (accepted) 
with 25 (partially) rejected participants is critical as is conducting 
correlational analyses in the subsamples with n’s of 8 and 9. 
This restricts the explanatory power of our results considerably. 
Although bootstrapping was applied to simulate a larger sample 
sizes, and visual inspection of the data was used to identify 
possible flaws in the validity of the statistical results, it would 
have been more ideal to have a larger group of participants 
available. The found effect sizes were fairly large, around hp2  = 0.12 
(which translates to Cohen’s d = 0.74, Cohen, 1988) which suggests 
that our found results may still be  valuable. However, as our 
sample size was small, it also increases the likelihood of sampling 
bias with an overestimation of these effects. Although it was our 
intention to support the workability of our suggested experimental 
procedure by pilot data first, an extensive replication with a 
larger sample size is nevertheless highly recommended to confirm 
the reported results. Yet, we  are confident that the data has 
potential to show the relevance of varying numbers the of rejecters 
systematically and the target of re-affiliative pro-social behaviors.
In addition, expected distinctions may not have shown up 
in the AAT as the number of pictures that were included of 
unknown innocent individuals was overwhelmingly larger than 
the amount of pictures of individuals that the participants had 
encountered previously. In general, the large number of trials 
may eventually have led to trained rather than impulsive 
responding in the end. In future research, it is therefore 
recommended to consider to either adjust the number of 
pictures and reduce the number of trials.
Furthermore, while the predicted drop in positive mood 
dependent on the number of rejecters makes us quite confident 
that our manipulation worked, we  need to acknowledge that 
the other affect states, anger, anxiety, and desire to escape were 
left unaffected by the manipulation. Merely anger underwent a 
general increase from pre- to post-manipulation but was irrespective 
of whether participants were rejected or accepted. Especially, the 
lack of effect on anger in response to rejection seems to contradict 
previous studies: Anger is one of the foremost feelings found 
to be evoked by social exclusion, which leads in turn to increases 
in aggressive tendencies (e.g., Williams, 2009). However, the 
temporal need-threat model by Williams (2009) also suggests 
that, following exclusion, individuals will always display re-inclusion 
facilitating behavior, except when re-inclusion seems unlikely. In 
that case, anti-social responses, such as aggression, are used to 
regain control or to force others to recognize their existence 
(Gerber and Wheeler, 2009). In our study, even though participants 
did not get a chance to interact face-to-face with their rejecters, 
they may have regarded the reward paradigm as a re-inclusion 
opportunity, and may therefore not have felt this need. In addition, 
feelings of anxiety or desire to escape may not have been 
significantly affected as participants no longer expected a face-
to-face interaction, thereby making the situation less stressful.
Lastly, the current sample only included participants with 
social anxiety at a sub-clinical level; therefore, it cannot be  said 
with certainty that these results are generalizable to the clinical 
population. Yet, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) do suggest that 
social anxiety is distributed along a continuum and effects at 
the high end should be quantitatively but not qualitatively different 
in clinical as compared to subclinical samples. Consequently, 
effects found here should be more pronounced in clinical samples.
Keeping primarily the statistical restrictions but also the other 
limitations in mind, it was nevertheless demonstrated that our 
proposed experimental set-up is a promising way to explore 
several aspects related to explicit as well as implicit behavior 
in response to social rejection. The results from this pilot study 
suggest that outright social rejection, as well as its degree of 
severity, may have significant effects on an individual’s emotional 
state and behavioral responding. After outright rejection, people 
tend to display explicit compensatory actions but only those 
with low degrees of social anxiety. An increasing degree of 
social anxiety, generally reverses these pro-social patterns: allotting 
less reward and showing more avoidance tendencies after rejection. 
With regard to the distinction between the target of the pro-social 
behaviors, rejecters, and accepters, only implicit behaviors 
tendentiously showed a difference: Avoidance of the first and 
approach of the latter. Again, social anxiety changes this pattern, 
showing a stronger approach tendency towards rejecters. In 
sum, it seems that, by behaving incompatible to what is typically 
expected after assumed as well as true rejection, individuals 
suffering from social fears may actually precipitate the situation 
they fear the most. Future research would need to seek out 
whether a lack of skill or the anxiety itself drives these behaviors. 
Regarding the methods, the presented paradigm is promising 
for future research as manipulating degrees of overt rejection 
eliminates interpretations of ambiguous ostracism manipulations 
and distils responses to outright and unmistakable rejection. 
In addition, it opens avenues to measure explicit and implicit 
behavioral responses toward increasing numbers of “rejecters” 
as compared to “accepters” and other unknown innocent others. 
Our results in addition to the fact that past rejections seem 
to increase social anxiety in future interactions and rejections 
(Levinson et  al., 2013; Stenseng et  al., 2014) could also inspire 
adjustments of treatment regiments for social anxiety disorder 
specifically aiming at behavioral responses after outright rejection 
in addition to (cognitions about) putative rejection. Providing 
training in adequate behavior in rejection, as well as acceptance 
situations, would be highly valuable especially for socially anxious 
individuals as such situations are ubiquitous in everyday life.
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